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Attachment to TM _____

3 June 1958

Dear

SUBJECT: Some Thoughts on Future Directions

It seems time after two months in this job to indicate where, I think, we as a Division are and should be heading, to identify some of our major problems and to solicit your views. First a few personal prejudices should be catalogued.

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A. Mission: I am something of a fundamentalist on this. I believe that [] was set up to do the clandestine and covert job that no other component could do. To the extent that we allow ourselves to be diverted from this purpose I believe we degrade our capability to perform our assigned mission. I am suspicious of the argument that [] must perform this or that overt task because only we can do it as well or as efficiently. The overt tasks involved may range from a one time

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[] request to high level pressure to keep us in certain overt nation building activities. The proper reaction to these pressures and requests is, of course, always a matter of command and political judgment, but I am personally convinced that we must to the maximum prudent extent move to devote our energies, funds and personnel to doing the job that can, in actual fact, be done only by []

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B. Professionalism: It is possible to carry out the boldest operation against the toughest target if it is done in a carefully planned and executed manner. I have a low threshold of tolerance for slipshod operations and for those who execute them, not only because they often explode in our faces but more importantly because they don't get the job done.

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C. Integrity: There are few personal qualities more important in this business, I believe, than our capacity to present honestly and precisely within [] the facts about both operations and personnel. "Tell it like it is" could well share space with other more classical quotations in our Headquarters front entrance. There will always be honest differences of opinion, but decision making at every level is a lot easier and righter if we are honest with each other about the facts.

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D. Command: At every level, from the Chief, [] to the case officer, there is a command process which involves: a) Deciding what should be done b) Giving an explicit instructions as possible as to what is required c) Making sure it gets done and d) Evaluating the results. The command line is and should be a two way street. An interchange of ideas between all levels is basic and necessary to the decision making process. All too often, however, we have difficulty making the hard decisions on what to do. we spell out poorly our requirements we fail to follow through and critically evaluate the results. I think we need to develop more precise ways of making the command process work.

Our operational mission will not change greatly as I see it. In clandestine collection we need to continue and improve our effort to get at the hard targets. We have made enormous strides in the past years in

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The key to our program in this hard target area must be an unyielding determination to build quality operations to produce quality reports. I would like it clearly understood that a good report weighs far more heavily in favor of a Station than a score of mediocre ones. Our reputation is built not on the number of reports we produce but on the extent to which they answer the critical high level requirements. The Soviet target is the hardest of all to crack, the most frustrating and the least rewarding in terms of return for our operational investment. In every Station which has access to this target I would like to see one simple objective -- recruit a Soviet official. We can worry about the refinements later. We will

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continue the pressure on the hard targets and on developing the professionalism throughout the Division which these targets require. We face an enormous challenge but the "Great Wall" is already broken and cracked and our "two mice" have been replaced by an increasingly productive operational effort.

In the field of covert action our course is not so easy to sum up as the problem is far more entwined with the wide world of political, social, economic and military events. Our efforts here once the covert requirement is identified must focus first on the question of how we can move people and influence events in an effective way. In this, I think, the leverage factor is critical. That is, if we expend our money and resources, is it likely to make any real difference? Are the covert action mechanisms we construct, when placed in balance with all the other forces at work in a country or area, going to have a significant impact in moving events in the direction we want them to go? It is easy to state the question, answering it requires operational, historical and social judgment of the highest order. It requires also an objectivity difficult to develop in a critical situation. There is much we can do and should do in the field of [REDACTED] action to advance U. S. interests in Asia. I hope together we can develop more precise ways of determining where we should invest our increasingly restricted supply of money and personnel.

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We will continue our efforts to develop better operational management tools, better ways of assigning and evaluating our personnel, better planning and programming for the future and will be in touch with you on the specifics. We need to thoroughly revamp our unofficial cover programs keep up the pressure on the technicians and communicators for better equipment and above all educate ourselves better both formally and informally for the demanding tasks that face us.

To meet the challenges of Asia and U. S. involvement in it in the years ahead, we will need all the drive, spirit and imagination for which this Division is justly famous. I will, particularly, need the help and support of each of you. I solicit your thoughts and comments on any and all subjects. Together, I'm sure we can move ahead.

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Chief of Station.